Bubbles, booms and crashes reinforce themselves
The financial markets are seen to
return to a so-called equilibrium quickly after they have temporarily
left it. Mainstream (neoclassical) economists talk about external
shocks or momentary changes created by the news that change the
reality markets confront. They have a strong faith for a quick return
to equilibrium that real life events do not seem to change their
perception in one direction or another. Even the prior booms that
offered insane prices, and the crashes that followed, have not shaken
this faith. Financial markets have escaped equilibrium too far too
often. The farther they escape the worse they recover without major
damage. Booms and busts go too far from equilibrium and stay there
too long for economists’ claims of quick returns to be true.
Exaggerations in the financial markets
produce self-reinforcing prices that are too high or too low. One way
to explain their reasons is George Soros’s theory of market
reflexivity. In engineering terms, there is self-reinforcing
feedback. The actions of market participants can be divided into two
distinct parts: a situation where participants perceive a situation
where they find themselves or where participants influence the
situation. Reflexivity is a two-way feedback mechanism where reality
shapes thinking and thinking shapes reality. The former is a chain of
events where thought and reality converge but never meet. They create
self-fulfilling connections that reinforce misunderstandings. Rising
prices increase demand without increasing supply and falling prices
increase supply without increasing demand.
Reflexivity occurs from time to time. It is important to understand it because it describes situations where misunderstandings can affect prices. Impact requires a strong two-way interaction between participants and the market, reinforcing misunderstandings that become the prevailing reality. Developments that move beyond the market equilibrium have limits. Eventually, the power of change will prove unsustainable and return the market to equilibrium with a self-reinforcing development. Reflexivity moves prices in both directions. Prices may go far below equilibrium. It rarely happens without exorbitant prices.
Effect of the money supply
It is logical that bubbles and booms require an increase in the
supply of money in the market and crashes require a decrease in the
supply. The above is easy to see by looking at historical statistics
on money supply. There are significant differences between the
bubbles and normal market fluctuations. The amount of money can rise
by tens of percent in a few years. At best, they do the same thing
every year. By monitoring the money supply, you can get a better
picture of the magnitude of the boom and the duration of its
aftermath. Following it, the outbreak of the boom can only be timed
afterwards because it is only one factor in a bubble.
The majority of the increase in supply comes from the increase in
debt. The increase in volume is influenced by e.g. the price and the
amounts and values of the securities required. As the price
decreases, demand increases, increasing the money supply, and as it
increases, it decreases, while the supply of money is the same. A
reduction in the required collateral increases the amount of debt
like increases in value. An increase in collateral reduces the amount
of debt, such as write-downs. The amount of debt increases the most
as prices fall, the amount of collateral required decreases and
values rise. The biggest bubbles and booms arise from the
self-reinforcing spiral of the previous interaction.
The worst collapses occur when the combined effect of the above
raises the amount of debt to unsustainable levels, causing an
inverse, self-reinforcing phenomenon in which the amount of debt
decreases, additional collateral is required and the value of
collateral decreases. The situation is rapidly getting worse. More on
these mechanisms can be found in the chapter on the long debt cycle.
By monitoring the supply of money, it is not possible to accurately
assess the likelihood of a bubble. By only following it, it is not
possible to assess whether a crash will occur. Without a sufficient
increase in money supply, there will be no booms and the supply of
money will almost never be reduced so much that there would be
collapses without bubbles.
The amount of money can grow unmanageable, both on its own and with foreign aid. In the first case, government finances need to be large enough for money to grow without a significant weakening of the currency. Examples of the former are the real estate bubbles of the current century in China and the United States. One of the hallmarks of the latter is the massive cash flows from abroad that strengthen the domestic currency. The Asian economic boom of the 1990s is a good example.
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